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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This case presents a question of first impression for this Court's resolution

-

whether it violates the Fifth Amendment protection against being placed in jeopardy
twice for the same offense where the State alleges a single act, coupled with a course
of conduct for which the defendant has previously been sentenced, in support of an
allegation of felony stalking. In light of relevant precedent from Idaho and the United
States Supreme Court, as well as persuasive precedent from other states that have
confronted this issue, the answer to that question is yes.
Clifford Stewart was charged with felony stalking based upon the State's
allegation that he had sent a single email to the alleged victim, and further based upon a
course of conduct that had formed the basis of Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor
conviction for stalking involving the same victim. The State also alleged, but later
dismissed, a charge of misdemeanor violation of a no contact order. Mr. Stewart filed a
motion to dismiss the stalking charge based upon double jeopardy grounds.
The district court denied Mr. Stewart's motion based upon a holding that, under
the Blockburger test, the crime of felony stalking had one element that misdemeanor
stalking did not and therefore the double jeopardy clause was not implicated.
Mr. Stewart thereafter entered a conditional guilty plea that resewed the right to
challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the stalking
charge.

He timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence, and asserts

that the district court committed legal error when it denied his motion to dismiss the
felony stalking charge because this charge was brought in violation of the Fifth

Amendment prohibition against a defendant be prosecuted a second time for an offense
for which the defendant has already been sentenced.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedinqs
In August of 2007, Clifford Stewart pleaded guilty to misdemeanor stalking based
upon his repeated contacts or attempts to contact a local television news anchor.
(R., pp.10, 115.) A no contact order was issued in that case. (R., p.10.) Several
months later, Mr. Stewart allegedly sent an email to the news anchor in which he
wished her a "loveing new year" [sic] and asked for an autographed picture. (R., p.10.)
When police contacted Mr. Stewart about the email, he told them that he had sent it,
and further admitted that he was aware of the no contact order that had been issued in
his prior case.

(R., p.10.)

Police then arrested Mr. Stewart for felony stalking.

(R., p.10.)
Mr. Stewart was charged with both first degree stalking and misdemeanor
violation of a no contact order. (R., pp.32-33.) In the State's information, Mr. Stewart
was charged with stalking based upon the allegation that he had written the alleged
victim an email and, "had previously been convicted of this crime against the same
victim within the last seven years." (R., p.32.)
Thereafter, Mr. Stewart filed a motion to dismiss the stalking charge based upon
the failure of the State to allege a course of conduct. (R., p.51.) At the hearing on this
motion, defense counsel informed the district court that, according to counsel's
understanding, the "course of conduct" that the State was seeking to rely upon in
support of this charge was the prior course of conduct for which Mr. Stewart had already
been sentenced in his prior misdemeanor stalking conviction. (Tr., p.6, L.25

- p.7,

L.12.) Because Mr. Stewart had already pleaded guilty and been sentenced for this
course of conduct, it would violate double jeopardy principles for this same course of
conduct to be charged a second time in the State's new first degree stalking charges.
(Tr., p.6, L.25 - p.7, L.12.) Mr. Stewart also noted that the affidavit in support of the
information filed by the State omitted any allegation of a prior course of conduct and
instead merely recited that Mr. Stewart had sent the alleged victim a single email when
a no contact order was in place. (Tr., p.6, Ls.6-24.) The statute defining stalking
required a course of conduct, which is defined as "repeated acts," and therefore the
State's affidavit in support of the information, as well as the information itself, was
insufficient to support the felony stalking charge. (Tr., p.5, L.25 - p.6, L.24.)
The State asserted that the single email could stand as a course of conduct
when viewed in conjunction with the other acts that formed the basis of the prior
misdemeanor charge. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.10, L.23; p.16, L.12 - p.17, L.1.) Further, the
State never disputed at this hearing that, with the exception of the single email sent
after Mr. Stewart's misdemeanor stalking conviction, the "course of conduct" relied upon
was the same conduct that formed the basis of the prior charge. (Tr., p.9, L.5 - p.19,
L.14.)
After the hearing, the district court entered an opinion and order that set forth its
notice to the State of its intent to dismiss the stalking charge. (R., pp.68-73.) In this
order, the district court clarified that it was treating Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss as
"an argument that the Amended Information is jurisdictionally defective because it does
not plead facts in support of all of the elements of the crime charged." (R., p.69.) The
district court found that the information filed by the State did not allege facts in support

of all of the elements of aggravated stalking.

(R., p.72.)

Specifically, the State's

Amended Information omitted any pleadings as to the facts in support of an allegation
that Mr. Stewart had knowingly engaged in a course of conduct made criminal by the
statute, that there was nothing setting forth a "course of conduct," and that there were
no facts alleged in support of the element that the course of conduct would cause a
reasonable person substantial emotional distress. (R., p.72.) The district court then
provided the State with notice that it would dismiss the stalking charge against
Mr. Stewart unless the State moved to amend its information within 14 days. (R., p.73.)
The State filed a motion to amend the information against Mr. Stewart, which was
granted by the district court.

(R., pp.84, 92.)

In the State's Second Amended

Information, the State alleged a prior course of conduct that subsumed the course of
conduct in Mr. Stewart's prior stalking case. (R., pp.94-95.) The State further alleged
three bases in support of the elevated, first degree charge: (1) that Mr. Stewart had
acted in violation of a no contact order; (2) that he had previously been convicted of
another stalking charge within seven years; and (3) that Mr. Stewart had violated the
conditions of his probation by committing the new stalking offense. (R., p.95.)
In the affidavit in support of the second amended information, the State
presented a further account of the course of conduct that led to Mr. Stewart's prior
misdemeanor conviction for stalking. (R., pp.89-90.) Apparently, the series of contacts
that were the basis of the prior charge began sometime in the Spring of 2006.
(R., p.90.) According to the State's own affidavit, the prior stalking charge subsumed
the contacts made by Mr. Stewart to the alleged victim, "between Spring 2006 to July
30,2007." (R., p.90.)

In the State's Suppiementai Discovery Response, the State provided notice to
Mr. Stewart of the facts that it intended to rely upon in order to establish a "course of
conduct," as required by I.C. § 18-7906. (R., pp.81-82.) All of the evidence that
indicated a specific date on this notice related to the course of conduct which formed
the basis of Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction for stalking. (R., pp.81-82, 89.)
Mr. Stewart filed a second motion to dismiss the State's charge based upon the
failure to allege a new course of conduct. (R., p.97.) At the hearing on this motion,
Mr. Stewart alleged that the State was required, pursuant to the plain language of
I.C. §§ 18-7905 and 18-7906, to prove a new course of conduct rather than a single act.
(Tr., p.28, L.24 - p.29, L.22.) Allowing the State to re-prosecute the same course of
conduct that was previously tried and resulted in a conviction would violate the double
jeopardy prohibitions contained in the Fifth Amendment, according to Mr. Stewart.
(Tr., p.30, L.18-p.31, L.14.)
The State took a slightly different posture at the hearing on Mr. Stewart's second
motion to dismiss with regard to the question of the factual predicate for the prior
misdemeanor stalking charge. The prosecutor attending this hearing admitted that he
was "not personally aware of the factual basis of [Mr. Stewart's] conviction," but
postulated that maybe the prior conviction did not subsume all of the facts that were
alleged in support of the prior charge. (Tr., p.36, L.13 - p.17, L.9.) The State then
argued that there might be no double jeopardy violation by speculating that, "some of
these acts may not have been the basis of a conviction." (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-9.) As an
alternative argument, the State asserted that the single contact should be deemed

sufficient by the district court based on the policy argument that, "waiting until there are
multiple contacts doesn't protect the victim." (Tr., p.37, L.10 - p.38, L.7.)
The district court denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the stalking charge.
(R., pp.104-109.) In doing so, the district court first found that the State had presented
sufficient information in its Second Amended lnformation to allege a course of conduct.
(R., pp.105-108.) For purposes of the motion, the district court accepted as true, "that
the defendant has been convicted in Minidoka County of the misdemeanor stalking
offense and that the Minidoka conviction arose out of the same course of conduct or
acts that form the basis for the instant prosecution.'' (R., p.106.) Because the State's
Second Amended lnformation expressly referenced more than one act, and because
the district court did not find any discernible temporal limitation on what constitutes the
series of acts for purposes of discerning a "course of conduct," the district court found
that the State's information alleged a course of conduct. (R., pp.106-108.)
The district court also held that Mr. Stewart's prosecution was not barred by
double jeopardy. (R., pp.108-109.) Here, the district court's analysis was more cursory.
The district court determined that, because first degree stalking had one more element
than misdemeanor stalking, double jeopardy did not apply under the principles
articulated in Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1932). (R., pp.108-109.)
Mr. Stewart entered a binding Rule 11 conditional guilty plea to first degree
stalking, but reserved the right to challenge on appeal the district court's denial of his
second motion to dismiss this charge. (Tr., p.61, L.6 - p.62, L.13; R., pp.134-136.) The
State agreed to dismiss the misdemeanor charge of violation of the no contact order;
and further agreed to a sentence of five years, with two years fixed, and probation

contingent on the district court's acceptance of that agreement. (Tr., p.62, L.17 - p.65,
L.22; R., p.134-135.)
Mr. Stewart was sentenced to five years, with two and one-half years fixed.
(Tr., p.101, Ls.15-22; R., pp.145-147.) The district court suspended this sentence and
placed Mr. Stewart on probation for five years. (Tr., p.101, Ls.23-25; R., pp.145-147.)
Mr. Stewart timely appeals from his judgment of conviction and sentence.

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the felony
stalking charge?

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion To Dismiss The Felony
Stalkinq Charoe
A.

Introduction
The State in this case was required to prove a "course of conduct" in support of

its allegation that Mr. Stewart had committed first degree stalking. The evidence that
the State was relying on in this case consisted of a single act - the sending of an email
to the alleged victim - coupled with the course of conduct underlying Mr. Stewart's prior
misdemeanor stalking conviction. Because Mr. Stewart had previously been convicted
of, and sentenced for, this course of conduct, seeking to punish him for these same acts
a second time violated Mr. Stewart's Fifth Amendment constitutional protection against
being punished twice for the same offense.'
6.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant has been twice placed in jeopardy for the same offense in

violation of the Fifth Amendment is a question of law that this Court reviews de novo.
See, e.g., State v. Bush, 131 ldaho 22, 33, 951 P.2d 1249, 1260 (1997). Additionally,
the question of whether a particular crime is a greater or lesser included offense of
another for double jeopardy purposes is likewise a question of law that this Court
reviews de novo. State v. Bryant, 127 ldaho 24,29,896 P.2d 350,355 (Ct. App. 1995).

'

Although Mr. Stewart's trial counsel referenced both "the U.S. and the ldaho
Constitution," there was no argument below as to whether the ldaho constitution
provides more protection than does the federal constitution with regard to protections
afforded against double jeopardy. (Tr., p.34, Ls.3-14.) As such, the double jeopardy
issue presented herein is analyzed solely with regard to the Fifth Amendment protection
against double jeopardy.

C.

The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Stewart's Motion To Dismiss The
Charge Of Felony Stalkina Because This Charge Constituted A Violation Of The
Fifth Amendment Prohibition Aqainst Prosecutina A Person Twice For The Same
Offense, And, In Absence Of The Course Of Conduct For Which Mr. Stewart Had
Previously Been Tried And Sentenced. There Was No Proof Of A Course Of
Conduct As Required For A Conviction Of Felony Stalkinq
1.

The Unit Of Prosecution For The Offense Of Stalkinq Is A "Course Of
Conduct", Which By Definition Requires Multiple Acts That Are Temporally
Connected, And The Onlv Course Of Conduct Alleaed Bv The State In
This Case Is A Sinale Act Coupled With The Prior Course Of Conduct For
Which Mr. Stewart Had Previouslv Been Prosecuted

A "unit of prosecution" is the manner in which a criminal statute permits a
defendant's conduct to be divided into discrete acts for purposes of prosecuting multiple
offenses.

See Woellhaf v. People, 105 P.3d 209, 215 (Colo. 2005).

Once the

legislature defines the unit of prosecution for an offense, "that prescription determines
the scope of protection under the Double Jeopardy Clause." Id; see also Sanabria v.
U.S., 437 U.S. 54, 69-70 (1978). To determine the unit of prosecution, appellate courts
look exclusively to the statutes that define the offense. Woellhaf, 105 P.3d at 215
In this case, the State charged Mr. Stewart with stalking in the first degree
pursuant to I.C.

3

18-7905. (R., pp.94-95.) This offense is defined as a violation of

I.C. § 18-7906, which defines the offense of misdemeanor stalking, coupled with one or
more enumerated aggravating circumstances. I.C. § 18-7905. A person is guilty of the
general misdemeanor offense of stalking if he or she knowingly and maliciously
engages in a course of conduct that either seriously alarms, annoys, or harasses the
victim and is such as would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress,
or is such as would cause a reasonable person to be in fear of death or physical injury
of a family or household member. I.C. § 18-7906(1). Therefore, in order to be guilty of

stalking in any form, the State must necessarily prove a "course of conduct" as the
actus reus under Idaho's statutory scheme - making a "course of conduct" the unit of
prosecution for this offense.
The legislature has defined "course of conduct" as, "repeated acts of nonconsensual contact involving the victim or a family or household member of the victim,
provided however, that constitutionally protected activity is not included within the
meaning of this definition."

I.C. § 18-7906(2) (emphasis added).

Under the plain

definition provided in this statute, a course of conduct necessarily requires more than
one act.

-

Here, the State charged Mr. Stewart with one act the sending of an email to the
alleged victim - coupled with the course of conduct that the State had previously relied
on for Mr. Stewart's prior conviction of misdemeanor stalking. (R., pp.94-95.) The
prosecutor at the hearing on Mr. Stewart's second motion to dismiss the stalking
charge, who was - by his own admission - ignorant of the basis for the prior
misdemeanor charge, hypothesized that, "some of these acts may not have been the
basis of a conviction." (Tr., p.37, Ls.1-9.) However, the State's speculative postulation
at this hearing is unsupported by the State's own affidavit presented in support of the
felony stalking charge and by pertinent case law.
As an initial matter, this Court may wish to note that the district court made a
finding for purposes of the double jeopardy issue in this case that the course of conduct
alleged by the State included the course of conduct that was the basis for Mr. Stewart's
prior misdemeanor stalking conviction. (R., p.108.) And the district court's finding is
correct in light of the State's own accounting of the evidence that it intended to prove at

trial to establish the stalking charge, as well as pertinent case law clarifying the
parameters for a course of conduct for double jeopardy purposes.
In the Second Amended Affidavit in Support of Criminal Complaint, it is
abundantly clear that the State is relying upon the course of conduct that formed the
basis of the prior complaint, and that these acts were treated as a single course of
conduct in the prior proceedings. After detailing facts regarding the single email sent by
Mr. Stewart on December 31, 2007, and Mr. Stewart's arrest after admitting that he sent
this email, Deputy Sheriff Randy Kidd set forth the incidents that formed the basis of
Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction. (R., pp.88-90.) After detailing the general
nature of these incidents, Deputy Sheriff Kidd averred that, "On August 6, 2007, Clifford
Stewart was charged with Second Degree Stalking in Minidoka County Case CR 20072759 for repeatedly displaying affection towards Gina Jameson by various means and
on numerous occasions between Spring 2006 to July 30, 2007." (R., p.90) (emphasis
added). This time period subsumes all of the allegations of prior acts that the State
indicated it was relying on to establish a course of conduct other than the single email
that was sent after Mr. Stewart pleaded guilty to misdemeanor stalking on August 23,
2007. (R., pp.88-90.)
The conclusion that the State was relying on those acts that were part of the
course of conduct forming the basis for Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor stalking charge
is further supported by consideration of the State's First Supplemental Discovery
Response. (R., pp.81-82.) In divulging the documents that the State was intending to
rely upon to prove Mr. Stewart had committed a course of conduct, the very first two
documents listed are the criminal complaint filed in the prior misdemeanor case and the

incident report from that case.

(R., p.81.)

The State also indicated its intent to

introduce several emails written throughout the period of time that was alleged as the
basis of the course of conduct in Mr. Stewart's prior misdemeanor conviction.
(R., pp.81-82.) Based upon the State's own accounting of the evidence, other than the
new email that was written after Mr. Stewart's prior conviction, the evidence that the
State was intending to rely on was evidence of the same course of conduct for which
Mr. Stewart had previously been sentenced.
The ldaho Supreme Court has addressed the importance of the distinction of
whether a course of conduct constitutes one offense or several offenses. In State v.
Major, the Court noted that the distinction is important because, "to charge a defendant
with two offenses when only one was committed violates the defendant's right against
double jeopardy." State v. Major, 111 ldaho 410, 414, 725 P.2d 115, 119 (1986). The
Major Court suggested pertinent considerations as to whether a course of conduct is a
single incident, including whether the actions were undertaken as part of a common
scheme or plan that reflected a single, continuing impulse or intent. Id. In this case, by
definition the charge of stalking requires a course of conduct with a unified intent.
Where the actions charged all demonstrate the requisite continuity required to establish
a course of conduct, the actions alleged in the charges should be treated as a single
unit of prosecution.
Moreover, to the extent that the State suggested to the district court that it could
retroactively seek to segregate the acts alleged in the prior course of conduct for which
Mr. Stewart was sentenced, this suggestion is contrary to pertinent case law. In the
United States Supreme Court case of Brown v. Ohio, the Court rejected an Ohio Court

of Appeals determination that the conviction for lesser offense of joyriding could be
segregated from the greater offense of grand theft merely, "because the charges
against [the defendant] focused on different parts of his 9-day joyride." Brown v. Ohio,
432 U.S.161, 169 (1977). The Brown Court held that, "The Double Jeopardy Clause is
not such a fragile guarantee that prosecutors can avoid its limitation by the simple
expedient of dividing a single crime into a series of temporal or spatial units." Id; see
also Sanabria, 437 U.S.at 72-73. This is particularly the case where, as here, the State
seeks to retroactively impose an arbitrary segregation of the acts previously relied on for
a defendant's conviction with the express purpose of reviving charges against the
defendant that would otherwise be barred by double jeopardy principles.
This is also in accord with case law from other jurisdictions confronted with the
issue of segregation of the charges in the context of felony stalking charges.

In

Eichelberger v. State, the Florida District Court of Appeals was confronted with the
issue of whether three separate convictions of aggravated stalking that were alleged to
have occurred within the same time period violated the prohibition against multiple
punishments under the Double Jeopardy Clause. Eichelberger v. State, 949 So.2d 358,
359-360 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2007). The Eichelberger Court held that these convictions
violated the constitutional protection against double jeopardy.

Id.

In doing so, the

Eichelberger court noted:
The State did not present evidence of any break in Eichelberger's course
of conduct that would mark the end of one series of acts and the start of
another, or the end of one form of contact and the start of another.
Instead, the evidence established one course of conduct that was ongoing
during the pertinent time period. As such, the proof supported a
conviction of one count of aggravated stalking.
Id. at 360.

As in Eichelberger, the State's own account of the basis for Mr. Stewart's prior
stalking conviction establishes only one course of conduct. Therefore, the suggestion
made by the prosecutor that the State could retroactively seek to segregate these acts
so as to support separate charges is not supported by the record in this case or by
relevant case law. Given this, aside from the single act alleged of Mr. Stewart sending
one email after his prior conviction, the course of conduct alleged by the State
subsumed the same course of conduct that was the basis for his prior conviction.
2.

Prosecutina Mr. Stewart A Second Time For The Course Of Conduct That
Formed The Basis Of His Prior Stalking Conviction Violates The Fifth
Amendment Prohibition Against Prosecuting A Defendant A Second Time
For An Offense For Which The Defendant Has Already Been Sentenced

The constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy, as contained in the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, consists of three separate
protections: (1) it protects against a second prosecution for the same offense after
acquittal; (2) it protects against a prosecution for the same offense after a conviction;
and (3) it protects against multiple punishments for the same offense.'

See, e.g.,

Illinois v. Vifale, 447 U.S. 410, 415 (1980). It is the second of these three guarantees
that is at issue in this case. Mr. Stewart asserts that, in seeking to rely on the facts that
served as the basis for his prior stalking conviction in order to establish the course of
conduct for a new stalking charge, the State has violated the constitutional prohibition
against prosecuting him a second time for conduct for which Mr. Stewart has already
been convicted and sentenced.

' The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment is applicable to the states
through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Illinois v. Vifale, 447
U.S. 410,415 (1980).

From the outset, it is necessary to clarifL that misdemeanor stalking and felony
stalking are the same offense for double jeopardy purposes given the district court's
erroneous conclusion to the contrary in this case. The district court determined that
double jeopardy was not implicated under the Blockburger analysis because felony
stalking had one or more additional elements than does misdemeanor stalking.
(R., pp.108-109.)

However, this conclusion stems from an incomplete Blockburger

analysis and is plainly erroneous given that the offense of first degree stalking expressly
subsumes the commission of the lesser offense of misdemeanor stalking as one of its
elements.
ldaho has adopted the Blockburger test to determine whether separate charges
constitute the same offense for double jeopardy purposes. See, e.g., Bryant, 127 ldaho
at 29, 896 P.2d at 355. Under Blockburger, "the test to be applied to determine whether
there are two offenses or only one, is whether each provision requires proof of a fact
that the other does not." Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304 (emphasis added). This test
requires the reviewing court to look at both of the offenses charged to make sure that
each contains at least one element that the other does not. Otherwise, there is a single
offense for double jeopardy purposes. Bryant, 127 ldaho at 29, 896 P.2d at 355. "If two
offenses are the same under [the Blockburger] test for purposes of barring consecutive
sentences at a single trial, they necessarily will be the same for purposes of barring
subsequent prosecutions." Brown, 432 U.S. at 166. "The prohibition against double
jeopardy has been held to mean that a defendant may not be convicted of both a
greater and a lesser included offense." Bryant, 127 ldaho at 29, 896 P.2d at 355. To
the extent that there is doubt as to whether two charged offenses constitute the same

offense for double jeopardy purposes, the rule of lenity requires that the doubt be
resolved in favor of the criminal defendant. Whalen v. U.S., 445 U.S. 684,694 (1980).
While the district court correctly noted that first degree stalking contained
elements that second degree stalking does not, the reverse cannot be said. Under
I.C. 3 18-7905, first degree stalking has as one of its elements the commission of
second degree stalking as defined in I.C.

3 18-7906.

I.C. § 18-7905(1). It is therefore

impossible for misdemeanor stalking to have an element that felony stalking lacks, since
felony stalking subsumes misdemeanor stalking in its entirety. As such, these charges
are considered the same offense for double jeopardy purposes under the Blockburger
test, and the district court's conclusion that double jeopardy principles are inapplicable
to the issues raised in this case is without merit.
Applying double jeopardy principles to the facts of this case leads to the
conclusion that Mr. Stewart was unconstitutionally prosecuted a second time for the
conduct that formed the basis of his prior, second-degree stalking conviction. The
United States Supreme Court Opinion in Brown makes clear that, "where ... a person
has been tried and convicted for a crime which has various incidents included in it, he
cannot be tried a second time for one of those incidents without being twice put in
jeopardy for the same offense." Brown, 432 U.S. at 168 (quoting In re Nielsen, 131 U.S.
176, 188 (1889)) (omission in the original). Additionally, it offends the constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy for the State to charge a defendant with the lesser
offense, and then seek a second prosecution for the greater offense after the defendant
has been convicted.

Id. at 168-169. "Whatever the sequence may be, the Fifth

Amendment forbids successive prosecution and cumulative punishment for a greater

and lesser included offense." Id. at 169. Here, the State sought to punish Mr. Stewart a
second time for the incidents that formed the basis for his prior conviction of stalking.
This violates Mr. Stewart's constitutional protection against double jeopardy.
This is in accord with the holding of numerous other jurisdictions that have been
confronted with this issue. See, e.g., Vazquez v. State, 953 So.2d 569 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 2007); Kinney v. State, 477 S.E.2d 843, 846 (Ga. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that
charging defendant with aggravated stalking for conduct that formed basis of prior
conviction for violating a no contact order violated constitutional protection against
double jeopardy); Edge

v. Commonwealfh, 883 N.E.2d 928, 930-932 (Mass. 2008)

(prosecution of defendant for stalking based upon facts underpinning prior conviction for
violating a no contact order violates constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy);
State v. Vigil, 65 S.W.3d 26, 35-36 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001).
The decision in Vazquez is particularly instructive in this case. The defendant in
Vazquez was charged, infer alia, with one count of aggravated stalking based in part on
events that formed the basis of a stalking charge for which he had already been
sentenced. Vazquez, 953 So.2d at 570. The only new basis for the stalking charge
alleged by the State was a subsequent violation of a protective order. Id. at 570-571.
There, as in this case, the defendant asserted that the State's reliance on the actions
that formed the basis of a prior stalking charge in prosecuting a new stalking charge
violated the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy. Id. The Vazquez Court
agreed. Id. at 571.
The Vazquez Court first found that these offenses were the same offense under
the Blockburgertest. Id. While the State asserted that they were not the same offenses

because aggravated stalking required proof of at least one additional element, the
Vazquez Court rejected this argument, concluding that, "The two are not separate
offenses under the Blockburger test because stalking does not contain an element that
aggravated stalking does not."

Id. As such, misdemeanor stalking was a lesser

included offense of felony stalking. Id.
The Vazquez Court then found that, under the record in that case, the two
stalking convictions rested upon the same factual basis. Id. More specifically, the
phone calls between the defendant and the alleged victim, "upon which the simple
stalking charge was based, were used by the prosecution at trial in this case to prove
the aggravated stalking charge." Id. The appellant was therefore convicted of stalking
and of the later filed aggravated stalking charge based upon the same actions. Id.
Because this violated the defendant's constitutional protection against double jeopardy,
the Vazquez Court vacated the defendant's aggravated stalking conviction. Id.
Here, as in Vazquez, Mr. Stewart's charges rested upon the same factual basis
as did his earlier conviction for misdemeanor stalking. There was only one additional
act alleged by the State other than the facts underpinning that earlier conviction. The
State's second prosecution of Mr. Stewart based upon conduct for which he had
previously been sentenced violated the constitutional prohibition against placing a
defendant twice in jeopardy for the same offense.
In absence of the course of conduct that was the basis of Mr. Stewart's prior
charge and sentence for stalking, the State in this case has only asserted a single act that Mr. Stewart sent the alleged victim one emaii. (R., pp.94-95.) This does not meet
with the requirement of a course of conduct as defined in 1.C. !j 18-7906 that there be

repeated acts.

IC. § 18-7906(2)(a).

It is worth noting that the Fifth Amendment

guarantees against double jeopardy are primarily a restraint on the power of the courts
and prosecutors based upon principles of separation of powers. See Brown, 432, U.S.
at 165.

Once the legislature has defined the scope of an offense and fixed the

punishment for it, "courts may not impose more than one punishment for the same
offense and prosecutors ordinarily may not attempt to secure that punishment in more
than one trial." Id. Although the legislature could have made alternate provisions for
the commission of a subsequent stalking offense, the determination of the Idaho
legislature is that the unit of prosecution remains the same

- there

must be a new

course of conduct, which is defined as requiring more than one act.

To allow

prosecutors to circumvent the legislature's own definition of this offense by permitting
proof of only one subsequent act ignores the plain language of the statute and violates
those principles of separation of powers that the prohibition against double jeopardy
seeks to further.

As such, this Court should reverse the district court's denial of

Mr. Stewart's motion to dismiss the first degree stalking charge and remand this case
for further proceedings.
CONCLUSION
Mr. Stewart respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court's order
denying his motion to dismiss the first degree stalking charge, and remand this case for
further proceedings.
DATED this 6thday of August, 2009.
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